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US Indo-Pacific Strategy heightens Korean Peninsula tensions

Relations between the two Koreas have reached their lowest diplomatic point in decades. The escalation of diplomatic tensions on the Korean peninsula, however, are best viewed in the context of the South Korean (ROK) presidential administration of Yoon Suk-yeol locking the country securely within the US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS). It has led a situation where the northern DPRK has responded by dropping their established doctrine of peaceful re-unification across the peninsula and subsequently increasing the likelihood of even greater hostilities.

In early August the northern DPRK began military initiatives which included the deployment of 250 ballistic missile launchers near to its border with the southern ROK. (1)

An official diplomatic statement issued by Pyongyang announced the move had been taken to defend its sovereignty, and that the country regarded the ROK as its 'principal enemy'. (2)

Behind the scenes, other initiatives, likewise, have included the suspension of government agencies linked to unification, and further questioning of the controversial maritime boundaries between the two countries. (3)

Both governments in Seoul and Pyongyang, historically, have had large departments staffed with civil servants employed for long-term planning where 'elaborate proposals were laid for unification, with co-operation leading to a loose federation and eventual merging of the two countries'. (4)

Secondly, the DPRK recognise the Military Demarcation Line, which was an extension of the 1953 armistice line, as the border between the two states. The ROK, to the contrary, claim the Northern Limit Line drawn up by the US, which deny the DPRK access to a twelve mile maritime boundary accepted under international law. It has always been a major diplomatic impasse; the ROK regularly use the disputed area to conduct US-led naval and related military exercises which the DPRK regard as a possible forerunner for a further military incursion into their sovereign territory.

The recent moves, therefore, depict a polarisation of diplomacy, away from a divided peninsula based upon kinship and a homogeneous peoples, toward a strained relationship between two countries. As many families have distant members in either country, the whole move away from a planned and eventual unification has some bearing upon political opinions of civil society.

It is important to note the official position of China toward the ROK during the period of the previous Moon Jae-in presidential administration was cordial; official diplomatic positions included reference to the previous government not 'following Washington's fanatical path … and … the Blue House's reluctance to be involved in anti-China campaigns'. (5) The same period was also marked by higher levels of constructive diplomacy between the two Koreas.

President Yoon Suk-yeol is not a popular political leader, he has faced numerous protests and mass demonstrations since taking office 'on the tightest of margins in South Korea's electoral history … President Yoon has been making good on his promises to the US, shaping, sculpting, and subordinating South Korea military, economic, and foreign interests to align with US policy and goals'. (6) While President Yoon Suk-yeon has played down recent diplomatic hostilities with the DPRK, he, and his supporters, have been held largely responsible for creating the conditions for the overturning of moves toward eventual unification.

It is no surprise to find the Yoon presidential administration has been conducting a witch-hunt of political opponents and threatened to use the ROK's repressive legislation from the previous Cold War, when the country was a military dictatorship, to stifle organised opposition. Articles 4, 7,8, and 10, of the notorious South Korean National Security Law aimed at curtailing pro-DPRK sentiments, has already been cited for possible use against those organising protests and demonstrations against the 'US militarisation of the country'. (7)

The presidential administration of Yoon Suk-yeon has also been responsible for placing the ROK firmly inside the US-led IPS; the US-led military agreement is regarded as establishing a 'united front against China', and, in effect, its allies, including the DPRK. (8) Over several years the US have placed Japan as a senior partner in their IPS global alliance, resting upon the so-called 'Quad' which has been designed to encircle and contain China's diplomatic influences. (9) The ROK, together with other Indo-Pacific countries, are regarded as lower-level partners in a regional intelligence framework. It is highly significant to note, furthermore, the changing nature of intelligence-gathering, from information about the DPRK's nuclear program, to the 'sharing of all military information'. (10)

The IPS, however, rests upon earlier US-led intelligence gathering networks established over a decade ago with a region-wide missile defence and radar systems designed for 'laying the foundations … to … combine US ballistic-missile defences with those of regional powers, particularly Japan, South Korea and Australia'. (11) Moves by the previous Moon Jae-in presidential administration in Seoul to establish cordial diplomatic relations with the DPRK, were regarded by the Pentagon as hindering their grand regional planning, despite it being regarded favourably by many South Korean people. (12)

Evidence the IPS has now replaced earlier intelligence-gathering networks was illustrated in the recent official media release which included information about heavy rainfall in the northern part of the DPRK, which appear to have caused population movements; the US-led surveillance system has moved from a preoccupation solely with armaments to a general and wide-scale monitoring of the whole of the country. (13)

The upgrading of US-led surveillance systems targeting the DPRK has also coincided with the US Defence Intelligence Agency recruiting and training an estimated 1,600 intelligence-collectors inside systems marked by a 'convergence of the military and intelligence agencies that has blurred their once-distinct mission, capabilities and even their leadership ranks'. (14) The strained diplomatic relations are based on streams of intelligence assessments, which focus upon supposed threats to 'US interests'.

The DPRK has, under the circumstances, now lost interest in cultivating friendlier diplomatic relations with its southern neighbour; recent US-led developments run counter to previous ideals and interests. Whether the DPRK policy changes can be regarded as temporary or permanent depend largely upon political developments in the ROK.

It is not surprising, therefore, to note an official diplomatic statement from Pyongyang about the recent developments included a reference to 'a significant and strategic shift due to the transformation of the US-led alliances into nuclear-based military blocs'. (15) It has been marked by what the DPRK regard as suitable and appropriate defence and security precautions, aimed at sending 'an effective message to the US'. (16)