VANGUARD - Expressing the viewpoint of the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist)
For National Independence and Socialism • www.cpaml.org
(Above: Flag of the Pacific Islands Forum; wikimedia commons: public domain)
Commentary about the recent Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) has tended to highlight the seemingly dysfunctional nature of the organisation without focussing upon the underlying causal factors of the problems arising. To do so would publicise some highly questionable US-led diplomatic and foreign policy positions with implications for Canberra. Highly strategically placed in a sensitive geo-political region, the PIF countries are increasingly being drawn into super-power diplomatic rivalry; they have, however, little to gain from participation, and potentially a great deal to lose if continued diplomatic stand-offs escalate into a theatre of real-war scenarios.
The Pacific Ocean forms a vast section of the globe; it links Asia with the Americas. Its diversity, likewise, has given rise to different cultures and social, political and economic systems: Melanesian, Polynesian and Micronesian cultures rest side by side. The over-riding PIF, the main co-ordinating diplomatic body composed of eighteen countries, has reflected the diversity since its founding over half a century ago. It prides itself on multi-lateral diplomatic positions, with member countries attempting to maintain independent foreign policies.
For generations the Pacific island countries were overlooked by major powers; their small populations, which tended to live subsistence lifestyles together with the vast distances from the centres of power, meant they lived in a power vacuum. (1) The rise of China, however, has seen Beijing's 'soft diplomacy' toward the vast region increasingly challenge traditional western hegemonic diplomatic positions. (2) The Pacific is a potential theatre of war.
The countries, furthermore, have always regarded Australia as the Mother Country. Moves, by the Pentagon, to establish regional military and security provision have also drawn heavily upon Japan as the northern hub for 'US interests'. The fact that Canberra has pushed for individual countries to sign defence and security agreements has already raised diplomatic tensions. Individual PIF countries have become concerned about their longer-term responsibilities under existing terms and conditions of the agreements.
Suspicions have arisen about the recent Australia-Solomons Islands agreement, for example, which led to Solomon's Prime Minister Matthew Wale launching the New Blue Pacific Ocean of Peace initiative: other PIF countries, however, have called through their foreign ministers for 'further consultation', before any support is given for the initiative. (3)
While western commentary was quick to point the accusing finger at China's hidden diplomatic role, Wale, furthermore, stands accused of 'implementing at a pace which doesn't reflect the traditional Pacific way of reaching consensus first amongst his own coalition domestically', which has alienated his political support in the country. (4) It has cast a dim light upon the role of Canberra: it remains important to note that Pacific cultures have highly democratic decision-making processes dating from thousands of years, modern parliamentary systems were largely introduced prior to political independence, and then to serve largely neo-colonial interests and prolong tutelage from behind the scenes.
The fact that Wale had to leave the PIF meeting early to return home to Honiara after a credible challenge to his leadership was planned while he was in Palau, remains evidence of the concern arising with the regional initiative. Wale, subsequently also suspended the country's parliament indefinitely, in order to retain his position. (5) The Solomon Islands, currently, is not a parliamentary democracy; questions, therefore, have arisen about political and diplomatic legitimacy and governance.
A major diplomatic consideration for the PIF, moreover, has been recognition of Taiwan. Only three of the eighteen members continue to support Taipei; the remainder now support Beijing's One China position. It has clearly had far-reaching implications; the internal politics of the Solomon Islands, for example, is still reeling following their diplomatic switch from Taipei to Beijing nearly a decade ago. Recent developments in Honiara follow the longer trend.
The fact that US regional defence and security provision remains based in Island Chain Theory, using strings of island chains to restrict access and egress into Oceania, is, likewise, a major PIF concern. Many of the remote chains have also been used by the Pentagon for siting radar and missile defence systems. (6)
The so-called Pacific Deterrence Initiative, aimed at strengthening conventional deterrence, has a network of precision-strike missiles along the First Island Chain in the western Pacific, running from Japan, Taiwan and toward the South China Seas. (7) The second chain runs from Japan, Guam and Palau. (8)
Nearly a decade ago, however, a US Congressional committee found the US were 'no longer the dominant power in the western Pacific'. (9) The rise of China had created conditions whereby the US had to compete with China to retain any semblance of traditional hegemony; the Pentagon was faced with no option but to increasingly rely upon Australia and Japan as regional hubs for 'US interests'. (10)
A recent regional military assessment conducted by the influential Defence Priorities Foundation (DPF), with strong links to the White House, for example, suggested that the Pentagon should end its mutual alliances with the ROK, the Philippines, Australia and Japan, and move priorities from the first island chain to the second. (11) It has sent alarm bells ringing. The subsequent diplomatic silence from the four capitals about the pressing matter, however, has been duly noted.
The military assessment coincided with a high-level diplomatic meeting between Australia and the US about the regional balance of forces and rising China. It included a number of insights into contemporary military thinking; it concluded, for example, with the statement that 'America could no longer be the world policeman by itself'. (12) The Monroe Doctrine is truly dead. The Trump administration, nevertheless, refuse to accept it.
The DPF assessment also drew attention to the problem of the Pacific and China's diplomacy and problems arising with the Trump administration and 'ensuring that the US understands that it actually has an important stake in not letting bits and pieces of the Western world get subsumed by powers with very different ideological interests'. (13) While China was not mentioned by name, the Trump administration clearly does not understand the delicate and subtle nature of the present-day regional diplomatic balance of forces.
The recent 55th PIF Summit, therefore, took place during a troubled time for the membership, particularly as there has been a 'growing belief … that the US is becoming an unreliable ally'. (14) The eighteen countries, far from being a backwater of the global map, have moved to centre stage in regional competition between the US and China. They are, increasingly, being asked to side with one or other country, when their traditional diplomatic position has historically been multi-lateral. It has presented considerable problems in domestic politics; most PIF countries regard the recent developments as a threat to their sovereignty and political independence. While Washington and the Pentagon and their allies need to acknowledge the problem, their recent behaviour has not won them much support across the Pacific. In fact, it has had a negative impact; western diplomacy has proved counter-productive when dealing with the vast region.
Issues regarded as fundamentally important for the PIF countries, for example, include the pressing problem of climate change; it has far-reaching implications for the countries concerned. Rising sea-levels are a major concern. The fact that Australia has continued to push for greater use of fossil fuels has, therefore, been a major diplomatic concern. The position of the Trump administration, likewise, has not been supportive of the concerns of the PIF. The cutting of overseas aid programs early in the second term of the administration penalised many poorer countries, including those of the PIF.
The fact that five of the PIF political leaders did not even bother to attend the regional meeting remains evidence, in itself, they regarded other issues being of greater importance and significance. (15) It would appear they had decided it wiser to play their cards, diplomatically, closer to their chests and not openly parade their stated positions; they have a vested interest in remaining safe, not sorry!
1. US strategic objectives in the South Pacific challenged by Sino-American competition, Strategic Analysis Paper, 10 October 2019.
2. Ibid.
3. Australia, Solomons push security reset, Australian, 27 August 2026.
4. Beijing's Taiwan fury linked to pacific leaders chaos, Australian, 1 September 2026.
5. Solomon Islands PM suspends parliament, Australian, 8 September 2026.
6. US Indo-Pacific Command proposes new missile capabilities to deter China, RFA., 5 March 2021; and, US to build anti-China missile network along first island chain, Nikkei, 5 March 2021; and, US v. China, Japan Forward: Politics and Security, Rieko Hayakawa and Jennifer L. Anson, 14 February 2020.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Study: US no longer dominant power in the Pacific, Information Clearing House, 22 August 2019.
10. Ibid.
11. US allies in Asia alarmed, Deutsche Welle (Germany), 15 September 2026.
12. Japan-China the ultimate flashpoint from Xi's Taiwan ambitions, Front page, Australian, 9 September 2026.
13. Ibid., page 2.
14. Is Trump losing the strategic plot?, Editorial, Australian, 19 August 2026.
15. Leaders missing, The Conversation, September 2026.