Re-loading missiles on ships: further integration of Australia into US war plans

Written by: (Contributed) on 19 December 2024

(Above: Guided-missile destroyer USS Dewey in the South China Seas. Source: wikipedia.org)

A scramble appears under-way by the US to secure access to port facilities across the Indo-Pacific region for sensitive re-loading of armaments.

The stated diplomatic position follows revelations about how the US Defence Department has already authorised their naval vessels in September to use Australian facilities for re-loading with cruise missiles.

No comment has been forthcoming from Canberra about Australia's stated diplomatic position on the matter or who authorised the operation.

The information was, nevertheless, leaked in one single sentence of a short and official report about another, related military consideration and matter.

Fears have arisen inside the Pentagon about the US readiness to fight a war against China in the Indo-Pacific. It is possible for the US to fire dozens of cruise missiles within minutes during time of military conflict. A major consideration, however, has been the ability of US naval vessels to re-load with further missiles at sea to continue hostilities. Strategists have raised concerns that if military hostilities begin in the Western Pacific, for example, the US is faced with an 8,000 kms journey to safe port facilities for re-loading with further missiles. (1) They have noted that 'the ability to re-arm at sea will be critical to any future conflict in the Pacific'. (2)

To date, the US military have used secure facilities on solid ground in sheltered harbours for re-loading; re-loading at sea requires accurate assessments of a variety of problems affecting
small movements which potentially have dreadful consequences in time of error.

While experiments are taking place using digital advances which include 3-D printing, specialised radar and motion detectors, the problem has yet to be resolved.

The US role in other spectacular achievements including landing a man on the moon in the late 1960s, and re-fuelling fighter jets in the air, is well-known, but they are struggling to overcome their failure to be able to re-arm missile-loaded naval vessels at sea.

The US is, therefore, seeking access to secure port facilities across the vast Indo-Pacific region. They appear to be more interested in remote places, rather than Japan and Guam which can be easily targeted by adversaries.

The news followed revelations that one of their naval vessels used Australian military facilities in Darwin to re-load missiles on-board the USS Dewey, a destroyer. (3) The Dewey has usually used a barge-like facility at its deployment base in Japan, but only used when the waters are calm. The Australian venture in September has appeared a departure from usual practice and took place with the bare minimum of publicity.

The moves, however, coincide with a short diplomatic statement from Canberra about 'China-proofing' Pacific states; concerns have arisen that China is increasing its diplomatic position across the Pacific and may seek basing facilities for its navy. (4) The concerns have arisen following revelations that the US were no longer the dominant power in the region and that China had successfully challenged traditional hegemonic positions. (5)

The region of the Pacific in question, furthermore, is geographically central to the US Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), with borders defined by sensitive military intelligence facilities in Australia, India, Japan and the US. (6)

Countries such as Nauru, Tuvalu, and other small Pacific states, have suddenly developed a highly geo-strategic diplomatic status on account of their position and historical allegiance with the US and Australia, while strengthening diplomatic links with Beijing.

Australia is practicing blatantly colonial relations with several of these countries, purchasing the right to make decisions in relation to their foreign policy positions, The recent $600 million gift to PNG enabling it to have a team in the National Rugby League is a case in point: it is conditional on PNG agreeing to freeze China out of any security relationship in favour of Australia,

They tend to be situated along sensitive island chains which have been used by the US to restrict access and egress by China into the wider Oceania region.

The island chains have also been fortified by the US in recent times as part of a $27.4 billion Pacific Deterrence Initiative. (7)

The recent sudden resignation of Tongan Prime Minister Siaosi Sovaleni, for example, has been conspicuously played-down to avoid unnecessary controversy, although would appear a major confrontation between the traditional elite and the elected government. (8) Tonga, it should be noted, rests on an arc from sensitive Australian military facilities in Queensland. (9) No doubt influence, from elsewhere, was brought to bear.

In conclusion, Australians living near ports and coastal military facilities might like to consider the potential risks for their local neighbourhoods: a human error when military personnel are re-loading missiles would create massive destruction and loss of life, particularly in light of construction projects under-way for storing 300,000 tons of jet fuel just fifteen kms from Darwin's CBD together with the US-led upgrade to the Tindal air-base for rapid deployment across the Indo-Pacific region:

We need an independent foreign policy!

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1. US Navy in race to re-load on high seas, Australian, 3 December 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. See: 'China-proofing' Pacific states, Editorial, Australian, 11 December 2024.
5. Study: US no longer dominant power in the Pacific, Information Clearing House, 22 August 2019.
6. The reasons behind Washington's push for GSOMIA., Hankyoreh, 12 November 2019.
7. US to build anti-China missile network along first island chain, Nikkei, 5 March 2021; and, US Indo-Pacific Command proposed new missile capabilities to deter China, RFA., 5 March 2021.
8. See: PM quits after rift with king, Australian, 10 December 2024.
9. See: Peters Projection, Map of the World, Actual Size.