Australia and Japan pushed by US to further fund its Indo-Pacific ‘interests’

Written by: (Contributed) on 25 August 2025

(Above Source: www.drishtiias.com )

Proposals by the Pentagon to expand the defence and security provision of their Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), have far-reaching implications for Australia. The hidden agenda behind the proposals is particularly revealing; if implemented, it is likely to foist a huge financial burden with increased diplomatic and military responsibilities upon Australia at the behest of the United States.

Throughout August a series of media releases pushed for closer diplomatic relations between Australia and Japan. It included proposals for the two countries to establish a 'formal security alliance', between the two regional hubs in the IPS for 'US interests'. (1)

The matter has entered discussion stage in Canberra, with policy considerations taking place in due course.

The moves, however, reflect the Pentagon's regional planning and their IPS: implemented over recent decades, it has placed the US-Japan alliance as an upgraded global alliance. (2)

Australia, likewise, remains an important consideration for US regional foreign policy, hosting a number of highly sensitive military and intelligence facilities which include Pine Gap.

Recent political and economic turmoil in Japan has caused the US disquiet; recent elections saw the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lose its majority. Japan, for the US, ‘for decades, has been the pillar of pro-western, democratic stability in our region'. (3) Its position is now shaky, with the ruling elite fearing opposition groups.

The Japanese economy has also not been performing well in recent decades. In fact, after reaching a peak in 2010, it has entered a period of prolonged decline. Projections for future years offer a dismal scenario whereby it has failed to even reach one per cent growth rates each year to 2030. (4) Viewed in comparison to a global average of 3.25 per cent, Japan's economic performance could be quite accurately regarded as mediocre. Official economic assessments have noted it remains in a ‘technical recession danger zone'. (5)

The US historically, however, has used Japan to maintain a ‘formidable economic presence in South-east Asia since the late 1960s'. (6) The presence, however, did not last forever.

In fact, the problem confronting the US is that ASEAN has now virtually replaced Japan as the regional economic powerhouse with serious defence and security considerations.

In 2022, for example, ASEAN members had already established a combined GDP of $3.6 trillion, 85 per cent of that of Japan. (7) Two years later the ASEAN group drew level with Japan, which proved a turning point with a $4 trillion total. (8) Projections now assess ASEAN as surpassing Japan with a nearly $6 trillion economic base by 2030. (9)

Studies of the changing balance of forces have noted 'ASEAN and the Chinese economies are becoming inseparably intertwined'. (10) The proposals for a formal security alliance between Australia and Japan are best viewed in that light. The agenda is quite clear.

Its proposers, in fact, have already stated such as security alliance 'would help keep the Americans in the region'. (11)

The US Defence Department have also elaborated on the grand plan with a request that Australia should 'integrate … with … other Asian allies into a stronger defence framework focused on deterring Beijing'. (12) The US agenda is, however, far from straightforward.

It has begun with a demand from the White House that Australia increase its defence budgets; much of the increased expenditure has already been allocated for equipment which has facilities for 'inter-operability' with US-led mainframe equipment. The Trump administration appears to be openly pushing for increased defence budgets in preparation for 'real-war scenarios', and keeping Wall Street and the military-industrial complex afloat.

As 1,600 personnel from the Australian Defence Forces joined Philippine counterparts for Exercise Alon 25 in August, the official media release from Canberra contained much of the same dreary commentary initially presented by the Pentagon. One of the biggest ADF war-games for 2025, it was publicised along the lines that 'this is a strategy of collective deterrence against Chinese aggression … the ADF was not in the Philippines by happenstance of coincidence', as stated by Strategic Analysis Australia in Canberra. (13)

As ASEAN increases it viability over and above that of Japan, we are likely to see more and more demands on Australia to pay for the US, as the balance of forces continues to turn against it.

By December, for example, Canberra will already have paid A$3 billion to the US-based shipbuilding industry for submarine production. (14) The AUKUS agreement is also likely, furthermore, to cost far more and be very, very expensive:

We need an independent foreign policy!

1. It's time we formalise the Australia-Japan defence compact, Australian, 8 August 2025; and, Australia should push for alliance treaty with Japan, Strategic Analysis Australia, 10 August 2025.
2. The reasons behind Washington's push for GSOMIA., Hankyoreh, 12 November 2019.
3. Japanese election harms region, Editorial, Australian, 22 July 2025.
4. GDP Japan, 1960-2024, World Bank Group; and, Japan: Economic Growth Forecast, The Global Economy.
5. Japan records modest growth, Australian, 19 August 2025.
6. Towards an equal partnership, East Asia Forum, Volume 15, Number 3, September 2023, pp. 3-5.
7. Ibid.
8. GDP Japan, World Bank Group.
9. GDP of the ASEAN countries from 2020 to 2030, Statista, 27 May 2025.
10. Towards an equal partnership, op.cit., 2023.
11. Australia should push for alliance treaty with Japan, op.cit., 10 August 2025.
12. No free ride in defence of free world, Australian, 14 August 2025.
13. Philippines exercise ADF's 'biggest for year', The Weekend Australian, 16-17 August 2025.
14. Australia quietly pays US., The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 July 2025.