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Balanced assessments and military bravado: Ratner at the Lowy Institute

Written by: (Contributed) on 27 February, 2026

 

(Source: Screenshot, Lowy Institute)

Opinions from inside the corridors of power in Washington and elsewhere often provide useful insights to accompany other more reliable assessments.

The changing balance of forces across the Indo-Pacific region is now generally accepted; comments from a well-placed source, therefore, have revealed the extent of the development and its implications for the US and traditional allies, including Australia.

In mid-February, Ely Ratner, former assistant defence secretary for the Indo-Pacific region, addressed the Lowy Institute about the changing balance of forces taking place across the vast region, and US foreign policy. (1) Ratner was formerly a 'key architect of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy' (IPS), and used the address to draw attention to the level of increased competition from China. (2)

Traditionally regarded as a region closely under US-led tutelage, the rise of China has seriously affected traditional assessments. In fact, a US Congressional committee nearly a decade ago assessed that the US was no longer the dominant power in the Pacific region, and becoming more dependent upon allies, including Japan and Australia, to maintain traditional hegemonic positions. (3) The Pacific, as a sub-sector of the wider region, has many sensitive shipping-lanes.

The findings of the congressional committee, furthermore, were subsequently used to redefine US regional foreign policy toward an updated IPS, which included the elevation of Japan to that of a global alliance with the US. (4)

The upgraded IPS was based in the framework of the 'Quad', which included the US, Japan, India and Australia, being used to encircle and contain China's regional influence. (5) Other countries across the region were relegated to the status of lower-level partners, linked into the Quad. (6)  

The US diplomatic position, moreover, was consolidated into the 2026 National Defence Strategy, which included reference to a greater reliance upon allies. (7)

Ratner also drew attention to the traditional US-led diplomacy of 'accomodationist' positions toward China. It had been challenged during the first Trump presidential administration 'by identifying China as a strategic competitor seeking to displace the US as the pre-eminent Indo-Pacific power'. (8) Ratner used his address to draw attention to problems emerging during the second Trump administration, which, he maintained, 'lacked the policy focus or coherence to manage Beijing's hegemonic ambitions'. (9) He has not been alone in his criticisms of recent White House behaviour; a recent high-level diplomatic statement from a German Army General, Major-General Wolf-Jurgen Stahl, noted that Donald Trump was 'an egomaniac, narcissistic, erratic deal-maker with authoritarian leanings'. (10) Serious questions have arisen about his limited diplomatic ability and that of his advisors.    

The problem, identified by Ratner, included Washington's and the Pentagon's diplomatic positions as having alienated various strategic countries across the wider region. They were responsible for having 'created genuine uncertainty in the region, and uncertainty in the alliance context'. (11) Good diplomacy is based in creating positions of trust and reliability.

The implications for the US include a recent statement from Singapore prime minister Lawrence Wong, that there was a need to prepare from a 'post-America world', as a drift toward a multi-polar era marked by changing trade patterns and economic uncertainty was taking place. (12) For Singapore, traditionally part of the US-led sphere of influence and a strategic factor in sensitive regional defence and security provision, Wong identified the vulnerability of the small city-country, and the fact that, 'the stakes are high … and … not temporary'. (13)

Wong also used the interview to highlight the rising prominence of ASEAN as a 'more credible block, both politically and economically'. (14) It, therefore, should be no surprise to find that Wong also drew attention to strategic ASEAN members and associates who were increasingly shifting their diplomatic attention toward China: Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia and Malaysia were becoming more closely linked into China's orbit of influence, and South Korea was also normalising its diplomatic ties with Beijing. (15)

The US, during the recent period, has, therefore, become more reliant upon the Philippines and the puppet Marcos administration in Manila, to push Washington and Pentagon positions inside ASEAN. Manila, for example, has been developed by the US as an important regional financial hub for 'US interests'; over 24 per cent of the GDP of the Philippines originates from its financial sector. (16)

The moves have also been accompanied by Washington and the Pentagon upgrading military planning for greater access into the Philippines with advanced missile systems and other weapons for use potentially against China. (17)

The opinions expressed by Ratner in the Lowy Institute forum have provided a useful insight into the changing balance of forces taking place across the Indo-Pacific and the US response to its traditional hegemonic position; the threat of war is increasing.

Ratner did not, however, question the dangerous nature of the US-Australia alliance:

                                         We need an independent foreign policy!    

*****
1.     Resist the urge 'to stick it with America', Australian, 18 February 2026.
2.     Ibid.
3.     Study: US no longer dominant power in the Pacific, Information Clearing House, 22 August 2019.
4.     See: The reasons behind Washington's push for GSOMIA., Hankyoreh, 12 November 2019.
5.     Ibid.
6.     Ibid.
7.     See: Official US website – 2026 National Defence Strategy – Washington, pp. 18-19.
8.     Australian, op.cit., 18 February 2026.
9.     Ibid.
10.   NATO ally's view of US President: 'egomaniac, narcissistic, erratic', Australian, 20 February 2026.
11.   Australian, op.cit., 18 February 2026.
12.   Ibid., and, PM Wong: As the US steps back, Vulcanpost, 24 October 2025.
13.   Vulcanpost, ibid., 24 October 2025.
14.   Ibid.
15.   Australian, op.cit., 18 February 2026.
16.   Why is Manila considered a financial hub for traders,  Admin., 25 July 2025.
17.   US pokes Chinese bear with missiles in the Philippines, Australian, 19 February 2026.

 

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