US, Japan and the Indo-Pacific Strategy

Written by: (Contributed) on 24 September 2024

(Above; Danjo Islands Source: voiceofalexamdria.com)

A big increase in Japan's defence budget can be regarded as a move by the Pentagon for allies to make substantial contributions for involvement in US-led military and security provision and the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Recent diplomatic hostility by Japan toward China, over an alleged incursion into airspace of strategic islands in the East China Sea, is best viewed in the context of the IPS as the basis of US regional foreign policy.

In August, Japan's defence ministry requested 8.5 trillion yen ($87billion) for the next fiscal year; it has amounted to their largest ever request, forming part of a five year 43 trillion yen budget, to March 2028. (1) The request was approved, although appears to have been a significant factor in the resignation of Prime Minister Fumio Kishada, whose approval rating slumped drastically. (2) Moves by successive Japanese governments to re-interpret clause 9 of their pacifist constitution have not proved particularly popular with many voters.

The 2024 Japanese defence also rested upon a previous one, whereby a 16.5 per cent increase the previous year, was allocated for realignment with US military forces. (3)

It is important to note that an estimated third of the 2024 defence budget has been allocated for 'satellite constellation', aimed at China, Russia and the DPRK. (4) Espionage and intelligence-gathering has become a Cold War obsession with the Pentagon; the US-led IPS, for example, also includes the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), 'which effectively allows for unlimited sharing of all military information'. (5) What actually constitutes military information is also categorised by what might be useful, not what is necessarily the case.

Elsewhere, across the vast Indo-Pacific region, many countries are following similar military upgrades, with increased budgets. In Australia, defence budgets are likely to place huge burdens on successive generations, effectively placing the country into almost unpayable long-term debts.

The moves closely follow the US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) which has included Japan being upgraded to the diplomatic position of a global alliance partner; the IPS then rests upon the 'quad', encircling and containing China from all sides. (6)

The significance of Australia within the IPS should not be under-estimated; recent high-level diplomacy between Canberra and Tokyo has included an official invitation for elite marines from the Japanese Rapid Deployment Brigade to participate in trilateral exercises with Australian and US counterpart in northern Australia. The move was accompanied by an official statement that 'this is a really huge opportunity for our three defence forces to operate in an amphibious context'. (7)

Other countries as US allies are then placed inside the IPS framework as lower-level partners, with specific responsibilities for hosting sensitive US military facilities. (8) The placing, by the US, of networks of precision strike missiles on island chains, has become commonplace; the so-called Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), has formed part of a large budget allocation of $27.4 billion. (9)

A recent official media statement from the US acting Under-Secretary for the Navy, Tom Mancinelli, has left little to the imagination: the Indo-Pacific has been described as the US 'priority theatre … and … the US Navy was laser-focussed on the Pacific region'. (10)

US intelligence assessments have continually drawn attention to the closer diplomatic relations between China and Russia as problematic. The balance of forces is swinging away from traditional US hegemonic positions; China has become the largest trading partner of most countries across the Indo-Pacific region.

A recent allegation by Japan that a Chinese Y-9 surveillance aircraft had violated their sovereignty off the strategic Danjo Islands, however, has shown just how tense diplomatic relations have become between US-led positions and China. The tiny Danjo islands, in the East China Seas, are uninhabited although close to China's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). (11) Situated at 32 degrees north and 128 degrees east, the sovereignty of the Danjo islands is not contested and face the important Chinese port of Shanghai; the five islands are not inhabited and cover an area of 4.7 square kms, rising to 281 metres above sea level.

Other islands in the area are contested between China and Japan and other countries, and remain sensitive and potentially problematic. Moves by the US to establish the IPS, for example, were accompanied by Japan nationalising 280 islands, of a total of an estimated four hundred strategic land-masses which have served as demarcation lines for territorial waters; they were referred to in government papers as 'important national territories'. (12)

While the alleged Danjo incursion was of only two minutes duration, the Japanese air force scrambled a full alert. Later commentary suggested the incursion had taken place as 'China was probing Japan's air defence network, seeking to obtain intelligence … as Japan … expands defence co-operation with the US and other countries in the region'. (13)

The speed of the Japanese air force reaction to the alleged incursion would tend to indicate the whole area of the East China Sea was under close surveillance. Japan is known to possess extensive Signals-Intelligence (SIGINT) facilities and a network of listening stations with extended range. (14) Whether sensitive military facilities are based on the Danjo islands was not, however, officially divulged. The fact the alleged incursion was also given high-level media coverage in Australia has, nevertheless, also remained a factor in assessing its diplomatic significance in the context of the IPS.

1. Back off, Japan and Philippines tell China, Australian, 2 September 2024.
2. Japanese PM jumps before he's pushed, Australian, 15 August 2024; and, Japan's Defence Ministry seeks record budget, Military,com, 30 August 2024.
3. Japan approves 16.5 per cent increase in defence spending for FY 2024, The Diplomat, 22 December 2023.
4. Military.com, op.cit., 30 August 2024.
5. The reasons behind Washington's push for GSOMIAS., Hankyoreh, 12 November 2019.
6. Ibid.
7. Top End to host elite Japanese marines, Australian, 6 September 2024.
8. Hankyoreh, op.cit., 12 November 2019.
9. See: US to build anti-China missile network along first island chain, Nikkei Asia, 5 March 2021; and, US Indo-Pacific Command proposes new missile capabilities to deter China, RFA., 5 March 2021.
10. Indo-Pacific is our priority theatre: US Navy boss, Australian, 4 September 2024.
11. Australian, op.cit., 2 September 2024; and, Chinese spy plane, The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 August 2024.
12. Japan to nationalise 280 islands, The Age (Melbourne), 10 January 2014.
13. Japan says Chinese aircraft incursion, The Star, 27 August 2024; and, Janes: Chinese Y-9 electronic warfare aircraft infringes Japan air space, 27 August 2024.
14. See: Japan – Naicho – Cabinet Research Office, Intelligence Services, Espionage, Spies and Secrets, Richard M. Bennett, (London, 2002), pp. 163-65.