Superpower rivalry and the Pacific Islands Forum

Written by: (Contributed) on September 2 , 2025

High level diplomatic controversy surrounding the forthcoming Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in Honiara is best viewed in the context of rivalries taking place with the present Cold War.

The US imperialists are also experiencing serious diplomatic problems with a steadily changing balance of forces across the Pacific with far-reaching hegemonic considerations. Chinese social-imperialism is gaining leverage. Other players, likewise, have been hovering in the wings of the controversy, seeking to side with the US, with stated and non-stated agendas.

On the eve of the forthcoming PIF meeting in the Solomon Islands, a request by China for the regional body to amend a 1992 diplomatic communique concerning the status of Taiwan as a 'development partner', has revealed the changing balance of forces across the Pacific in recent decades. (1) It has followed a controversial decision taken by the PIF last year to delete references to Taiwan in the official 2024 Summit communique. (2)

China, in 1992, was still in the early stages of dramatic capitalist economic development and PIF members were keen to draw the country into their diplomatic spheres. After three decades of economic development, however, China has become the regional economic powerhouse; as a serious competitor to US hegemony, the present Cold War is not ambiguous. It has led to an official diplomatic statement from PIF members, for example, that 'there is no denying that China is trying to extend its footprint in the Pacific and so is the US'. (3)

In fact, an official US congressional study of the rivalry nearly a decade ago concluded that the US were no longer the dominant power in the Pacific. (4) The study noted that 'US military superiority is no longer assured and the implications for American interests and American security are severe … China has also extended its soft power influence in the region … the US and partner countries consider a pincer movement around territory Beijing wishes to control'. (5) Taking GDP growth rates as a yardstick, China's influence grows.

While the Pentagon has extended its Indo-Pacific Strategy with the Pacific being enclosed in its boundaries, China's regional diplomacy has enabled it to already gain access to eighty per cent of the region's Exclusive Economic Zones. (6) While the development has thrown a long shadow on the prospects for deep-water mining for rare earth minerals, it has also raised US concerns about the longer-term security of sensitive regional facilities, including their defence hub based on Guam, linked to Pine Gap, central Australia, and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. (7)
The balance of forces across the fourteen Pacific Island countries is not difficult to assess.

China, for example, now has embassies in ten Pacific countries and diplomatic recognition in an eleventh; it possesses a major diplomatic presence across the wider region. Taiwan, to the contrary, is struggling to retain even limited diplomatic presence. Only three countries in the region now recognise Taiwan: the Marshall Islands, Palau and Tuvalu.

Taiwan, nevertheless, remains strategic for US regional considerations; it is central to US defence and security policy with island chains. It is regarded by the Pentagon as under threat. Numerous, questionable, intelligence assessments about China's eventual intention to invade Taiwan, therefore, are issued on a daily basis as a cover for US-led militarisation.

Pentagon planning has also included increased military presence with troop rotations in Australia, endless streams of military exercises and the placing of missiles on remote islands along the first island chain. (8) The first island chain consists of groups of small and strategically sensitive landmasses from Taiwan, Okinawa and the Philippines. (9) The fortification of the chain is aimed at restricting China's access into the second island chain in the western Pacific, which runs from Japan to Guam and ends in the south of the region with Indonesia. It is, however, already creaking under the strain of China's competition.

As the Cold War rivalries escalate, the PIF have decided to exclude all 21 'dialogue partners' from the forthcoming Honiara meeting. It has been speculated that China 'was behind the decision to block partners from the forum', by using skilful diplomacy to exclude Taiwan. (10) The move, for example, has left the New Southbound Policy of ruling administrations in Taipei in tatters with its commitment to Taiwanese officials being invited to regional dialogues on the Indo-Pacific. (11)

While the controversy was quietly being discussed in diplomatic circles, a major move by Israel to send deputy foreign minister, Gideon Sa'ar on an official tour of PIF countries, including Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Nauru, Palau, Tuvalu and Tonga, has raised stakes in the US-led diplomatic conflict. (12) The high-level diplomacy was prepared ostensibly to prepare for key votes in the United Nations amongst countries usually backing Israel. The diplomatic tour was accompanied by an official media release which noted, for example, 'the Pacific Island states constitute an important focus of support for Israel across various international frameworks'. (13) Open diplomatic discourse has been a convenient cover.

A far more likely Israeli agenda item, however, will be the selling or upgrading of sophisticated weaponry used by the US in the region, including the fortification of island chains, particularly with radar, signals and intelligence facilities. While Gaza has been the recent testing ground for the Israeli defence sector, its close diplomatic links with the US have shown it a willing contributor to wider hegemonic positions elsewhere. The carefully worded media release, for example, also noted it was 'aimed at deepening and advancing Israel-Pacific relations in a wide range of bilateral, multilateral and strategic fields'. (14)

While Australia has been assured of a place in the PIF meeting it remains to be established what their contribution will be toward the wider diplomatic controversy and Israeli involvement in the Australian defence sector, linked to the latter being a major regional hub for 'US interests', particularly in the Pacific: We need an independent foreign policy!

1. China's latest Pacific demand makes waves, Australian, 21 August 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Study: U.S. no longer dominant power in the Pacific, Information Clearing House, 22 August 2019.
5. Ibid.
6. The reasons behind Washington's push for GSOMIA., Hankyoreh, 12 November 2019; and, US v. China, Japan Forward: Politics and Security, Rieko Hayakawa and Jennifer L. Anson, 14 February 2020.
7. US v. China, op.cit., 14 February 2020; and, US intensifies military presence in Indo-Pacific, The Global Times (Beijing), 24 July 2018.
8. US to build anti-China missile network along first island chain, Nikkei, 5 March 2021; and, US Indo-Pacific Command proposes new missile capabilities to deter China, RFA., 5 March 2021.
9. Ibid.
10. Australian, op.cit., 21 August 2025.
11. See: Beijing keeps a wary eye on new US Taipei outpost, Australian, 18 June 2018.
12. PM 'forever tarnished', Israel looks to Pacific, Australian, 22 August 2025.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.